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Abstract
Facing low participation rates of old workers and an increase in life ex-
pectancy, in the last two decades many developed countries have reformed
their social security systems to improve their long-term nancial sustain-
ability. In Europe, the starting point for the policy maker has been the
increase in the statutory retirement age and the gradual phase-out of early
retirement schemes. Against the common trend, the Portuguese legislator
approved in 1999 an early retirement reform, allowing older workers to
exibilize their retirment decision. In this paper I analyze the e¤ects of
the 1999 reform on the retirement decision of the workers and the rms
employment adjustment. I nd that after the reform workers retire earlier,
and that the reform resulted in a job destruction process as rms do not
replace old workers with young and prime age ones. I conclude that the
reform failed to stimulate young employment and by allowing workers to
retire earlier posed risks to the long-term sustainability of the Portuguese
social security system.
Keywords: Social security, early retirement, labor force, net job creation
1 Introduction
The unsustainable debt dynamics of many advanced economies have stimulated
a debate amongst policy-makers and academics worldwide on how to reach a
structural budget balance, especially lately in troubled Euro zone periphery.
Given the large share of social security expenditures in total public spending in
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the developed world, reforming the social security system has been the starting
point for many policy-makers.
In Europe social security systems are su¤ering from two main phenomena:
low participation rates especially in the extremes of the age spectrum (younger
and older cohorts) and population ageing. If the latter is not matched with
an increase in the participation rates of the elderly, overall participation rate
will come down bringing with it an increase in the old-age dependency ratio,
a widely-used measure for the burden of social security spending on the work-
force.1 Low labor force participation of older cohorts coupled with population
ageing and excessive social security benets have forced the European Union
(EU) policy-makers to keep track of the population trends underlying the in-
crease in social security spending. Back in 2009 the Economic and Financial
A¤airs (ECOFIN) Council gave a mandate to the Economic Policy Committee
(EPC) to develop projections for social security-related public spending based
on population projections from the Eurostat. The EPC created a working group,
the Ageing Working Group (AWG), to deal with the issue. The gures emerging
from the latest report (2011) are quite worrying: the old-age dependency ratio
is likely to increase and almost double from 27.6 in 2011 to 53.3 in 2060, due
to an increase in life expectancy coupled with a low birth rate in almost every
European country. The latest available EPCs projections on public pension ex-
penditures show an average Euro Area (EA) increase in pension-related public
spending from 11% to 13.8% of GDP by 2060.2 Thus, to reform their social
safety nets and make them sustainable over time the EU policy makers have to
deal with the problem of population ageing unmatched with an increase in the
labor force participation of older cohorts.
To stimulate elderly participation in the labor force and thus improve the
scal sustainability of social programs and reduce their burden on the labor
force, in the last ten to fteen years almost every European country has reformed
its social security system. Measures range from fundamental reforms such as
the shift to dened contribution schemes to parametric reforms and changes in
the early retirement schemes. The most common pension reform in the last two
decades has been the increase in the legal retirement age. In Austria, the 2003
reform gradually increased the legal retirement age to 65 and 60 for men and
women, respectively. Amongst the countries that implemented fundamental
reforms, Italy introduced in 1995 a gradual shift from the generous dened-
benet scheme to a notional dened-contribution scheme, which o¤ers strong
nancial incentives for late retirement. In Portugal, to link the benet stream
to the average life expectancy at retirement, the policy makers introduced in
2007 a sustainability factorthat corresponds to a penalty for early retirement.
According to the EPC-AWGs projections, the implementation of these reforms
should bring an increase in the labor force participation of people aged 55-64 by
around 9.2pp by 2020, 14.8pp by 2040 and 15.5pp by 2060. For a country that
1Old-age dependency ratio = People aged 65 or more/People aged 15-64.
2Estimates are dated 2009. In the latest report, [...] the EPC decided that it would be
preferable if projections of pension expenditure were carried out by the Member States using
national models.
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modied the structure of the system (fundamental reform) such as Italy, the
increase in elderly participation is expected to be as high as 22.1pp by 2060. In
Portugal, on the other hand, the implementation of a non-fundamental reform
will deliver only an 8pp increase in the elderly participation rate by 2060.3 These
projections should promote the implementation of fundamental reforms as they
naturally increase the tax-benet links of pension systems and create incentives
for a longer working life.
Even though population ageing and deterioration in public nances stem-
ming from excessive pension-related spending is nowadays a consolidated issue
in the European and worldwide debate, back in the early 1980s the position
of the reforming policy maker was quite the opposite, especially in Europe. In
1982 the European Union approved a recommendation to the Member States in
which it defended the right to a exible retirement age.4 According to the Eu-
ropean Directive, Member States had to reform their social security system to
allow workers to choose freely their retirement age and avoid imposing excessive
penalties for early retirement. Up until the 2000s, some countries welcomed
this guidance and reformed their social security system to facilitate early re-
tirement, also moved by the possibility of freeing up jobs for younger cohorts.
The experiment resulted to be a failure, especially in Germany, as documented
by Jackson (2003). Portugal have rst facilitated the access to early retirement
schemes to curb the problem of long-term unemployment (1993), to then extend
the exibility in retirement age (with a penalty for early retirement) to all the
workers aged 55-65 with at least 30 years of contributions to the system (1999).
Studying the Portuguese reform and its outcome can help understanding why
some social security systems in Europe are destined to grow unsustainably. More
concretely, one should be interested in understanding if the implementation of
such a reform creates incentives for early retirement, even though a penalty was
embedded in the design of the reform. If early retirement is not coupled with
the creation of jobs for younger cohorts, social security spending is likely to
increase, creating an excessive burden on the reduced workforce. In addition,
analyzing the outcome of the reform at the aggregate level could reveal the main
trends in the labor creation process in Portugal. In this paper I am interested
in estimating the impact of the early retirement reform on the hazard of leaving
the labor force for male workers in Portugal. I exclude female workers to avoid
mixing the impact of two di¤erent reforms that a¤ected the Portuguese labor
market during the 1990s: one is the reform under analysis, while the other is the
increase of the female legal retirement age by 1999 (the reform was approved
in 1993 with a gradual phase-in ended in 1999). Given that workers, in the
post-1999 period, have the possibility to retire earlier, they might e¤ectively
decide to leave the labor market before 65 years old and, on the other hand,
rms might decide not to substitute them with younger or prime-age workers.
In other words, I am interested in the job creation and destruction process in the
post-reform period in Portugal. The main questions I want to address are: Does
3See the EPC and EC Report (2011) on population ageing for a detailed description of the
reforms included in the projections exercise for each country.
4EU Council Directive 82/857/CEE.
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the early retirement scheme introduced in 1999 increase the hazard of leaving
the labor market before statutory retirement age for male workers? Are rms
willing to substitute these early-retiring older workers with young or prime-age
ones? Has Portugal, ceteris paribus, created or destructed jobs as a consequence
of the 1999 reform?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main ndings of
the literature on early retirement and o¤ers an overview of the main stylized
facts on older workersparticipation rates. Section 3 presents the institutional
framework in Portugal for both the pre- and post-reform periods. I discuss
methodology and data in section 4. Section 5 analyses the retirement decisions
of the workers and the employment adjustment of the rms after the 1999 reform
and presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes and presents the main
ndings and policy implication for the future of the European policy debate.
2 Literature review and stylized facts on early
retirement
Given the overwhelming evidence of the decrease in the elderly participation
rates since the early 1970s (especially for male workers aged 55-64), previous
literature has been focused on investigating the reasons of such trend (Table 1).
Diamond (2005) nds that the increase in real earnings has played a central role
in this phenomenon. He argues that higher real earnings allows for higher con-
sumption patterns even without an increase in the working life, which seemed
natural considering the increase in the average life expectancy.5 From a per-
spective of income and substitution e¤ects, the income e¤ect prevails and higher
consumption is consistent with an increase in leisure. Blöndal and Scarpetta
(1998) observe that much of this early withdrawal resides in the nancial dis-
incentives to work longer. They argue that working one extra year after the
statutory retirement age corresponds to an implicit tax on continued work, as
the drop in old-age pension wealth amounts to 50-80% of gross income, thus
removing incentives to work longer.6 Given that one-extra year of work corre-
sponds to both foregone benets and paid contributions, eligible workers prefer
to retire earlier if the penalty for early retirement doesnt o¤set the drop in
pension wealth. Finally, Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) estimate using pooled
cross-country and time series data for 15 countries an econometric model for
the labor supply of older workers, including incentives for early retirement and
other factors that might explain the retirement decision (such as the prime-age
workers unemployment rate, the level of wage rigidities and others).7 They nd
evidence that the removal of disincentives to work for the 55-64 year-olds could
5Diamond (2005) also refers to the decrease in the physically demanding labor.
6Pension wealth is dened as the future value of the stream of pension benets minus
pension contributions.
7Prime-age workers unemployment rate could retain unemployed older workers from ac-
tively searching for a job, as it acts as a discouragement factor.
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increase their participation rates by 4-8%, depending on the generosity of such
income support programs.
Table 1. Labor force participation rate, men 55-64, selected
OECD countries
Country Labor force participation, males, 55-64 Change
1970 1980 1990 2000 2011 2000-2011
Australia 85.11 69.02 62.83 60.79 71.65 10.86
Belgium .. .. 35.41 36.31 47.82 11.51
Canada .. 74.48 64.00 60.70 68.46 7.77
France .. .. 39.35 35.35 47.08 11.73
Germany 80.24 67.33 55.94 52.41 71.68 19.26
Greece .. .. 59.46 57.34 57.28 -0.07
Ireland .. .. 65.02 64.91 65.48 0.57
Italy 48.20 39.60 53.04 42.75 50.67 7.92
Japan 86.65 85.36 83.26 84.14 83.14 -1.00
Netherlands .. 63.15 45.67 50.94 68.61 17.66
Portugal .. 74.62 66.48 64.43 61.64 -2.79
Spain .. 75.87 62.48 60.46 63.66 3.19
Sweden 85.41 78.81 75.49 72.64 80.05 7.41
United Kingdom .. .. 68.14 63.22 68.62 5.40
United States 82.96 72.11 67.77 67.30 69.30 2.05
EU 15 67.07 65.77 55.43 51.50 61.20 9.70
Europe 67.07 66.21 56.25 51.28 59.38 8.10
G7 80.52 72.94 65.69 63.50 68.78 5.28
North America 82.96 72.32 67.37 68.67 70.54 1.88
OECD 79.01 73.03 64.84 62.53 67.61 5.08
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics (online)
Gruber and Wise (2002) calculate the amount of the implicit tax on contin-
ued work after retirement is possible. They base their calculations on the missed
benets when postponing retirement and the existence of a pension premium
for late retirement. The implicit tax can be seen as the decrease in the expected
discounted lifetime income for a worker who decides to continue working after
the statutory retirement age (or after the rst available age of retirement where
early pensions are available). They conducted their analysis on a sample of 11
countries and found that the higher the tax forcethe lower the participation
rates of elderly workers. Thus many social security systems include a penalty
for late retirement, and usually individuals prefer to retire as soon as they are
eligible for retirement in order to avoid loosing income.8
8 In principle, statutory and early retirement age should not per se a¤ect retirement deci-
sion. According to the lifecycle hypothesis, forward-looking individuals can choose the retire-
ment age that maximizes their welfare by borrowing or lending in the capital markets (Duval,
2003). However, even the most detailed microeconomic models failed to explain the large
jump in retirement rates at the early and statutory retirement ages.
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Gruber and Wise (2002) conclude, after running a simulation on the selected
11 countries, that delaying benet eligibility by 3 years could increase the par-
ticipation rates for men aged 56-65 from 23% to 36%, o¤ering empirical support
against the application of the life-cycle theory in this context.
Given the evidence of widespread use of early retirement schemes, it is useful
to take a closer look to the characteristics of those who leave the labor market
earlier than the statutory retirement age. Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) show
using data from the European Union Labor Force Survey of 1995 that di¤erent
educational attainment are related to di¤erent participation rates in the labor
force. In Portugal, for instance, the share of retirees among male workers aged
55-64 with vocational education is almost double than for those with tertiary
education (Table 2). I nd evidence that the conditional probability for male
workers of leaving the labor force earlier (hazard ratio) is higher for low-skilled
workers in Portugal (see section 5 for more details). The common explanation
of these patterns is that lower education is usually related to lower incomes and
lower job stability, thus making more attractive for low-educated workers to
retire earlier.
Table 2. Share of retirees among male workers 55-64 by
educational attainment in 1995, selected EU countries
Country No further Vocational Tertiary
education (%) education (%) education (%)
Belgium 53.40 57.60 36.90
Denmark 32.50 24.10 15.10
Finland 35.00 43.60 30.20
France 51.10 47.60 28.90
Germany 29.20 28.50 21.60
Greece 29.60 38.60 35.40
Italy 44.70 47.40 22.20
Luxembourg 74.50 62.50 28.40
Netherlands 56.80 48.20 40.80
Portugal 28.20 40.00 20.80
Spain 24.90 26.90 21.60
United Kingdom 24.10 20.60 21.40
Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998)
Early retirement have complemented the problem of ageing population and
have resulted in an increase of the old-age dependency ratio, which in turn is
considered the crucial problem to the nancial sustainability of the unfunded
pension schemes (PAYG). The obvious question then is why the majority of
voters in many OECD countries supported such early retirement schemes. An
interesting politico-economic explanation of this issue is o¤ered by Conde-Ruiz
and Galasso (2003). Using an overlapping generation model they argue that
the political support for generous early retirement schemes hinges on two con-
ditions: rst, the existence of a large number of redundant and unemployed
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elderly workers with incomplete working history, the case of many European
countries. Second, the early retirement scheme has to include an element of in-
tragenerational redistribution via the utility from leisure.9 If the rst condition
ensures the creation of early retirement schemes, the second one is needed in
order to ensure its political sustainability over time. The majority of voters who
support the scheme is composed by redundant or unemployed elderly workers
and by low-ability young workers who expect to retire early.10
One of the main issues for policy makers in Europe and around the world in
the last two decades has been how to increase labor force participation and o¤set
the deterioration in public nances stemming from early retirement and ageing
population. The obvious and at the same time controversial choice has been to
reform the social security systems to remove or at least reduce the implicit tax
on continued work. The pension reforms approved by these policy makers can
be used as "policy experiments" to gauge the impact of the reforms on labor
market participation rates, especially of the elderly. Arpaia, Dibzack and Pierini
(2009) analyze the short-term impact of pension reforms on labor participation
rates for male and female workers in the 50-64-age range. Using a sample of
27 countries over the period 1990-2006 and a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach
controlling for the economic cycle, they found that fundamental reforms increase
the participation rates of older men in the EU and EMU by about 2/3 and 12
percentage points within 2 years, respectively. Non-fundamental reforms mostly
a¤ect female participation rates, while for men the e¤ect is insignicant. What
is more interesting for our purposes, early retirement reforms a¤ect men partic-
ipation rates only in the EMU and for the 60-64 age group. The authors nd
that after such a reform the increase in the participation rate for this subgroup
is about 3pp within 2 years.11
Given that the focus of my analysis is Portugal, it is worth taking a closer
look to the main ndings related to the retirement patterns in this country. Al-
buquerque, Arcanjo and Escaria (2009) use the Eurostat European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) to investigate the main characteristics of the early re-
tirees in Portugal. Using both hazard rates and probit estimates, they nd that
health status positively a¤ects the early retirement decisions, while family size
has the opposite e¤ect. Surprisingly, they nd that educational outcome does
not inuence participation rates of elderly workers. If evidence of the e¤ect of
health on early retirement is extensive, also education seems to play a role (Table
9 If leisure is valued indi¤erently among individuals, those with higher incomes nd less
convenient to retire earlier, as the increase in utility coming from leisure might not o¤set the
loss in utility from the foregone income. Thus, the early retirement scheme is mostly used
by low-income individuals and de facto represents an intragenerational redistribution scheme.
Empirical evidence of this fact is found in Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998).
10Low ability is usually associated with lower educational attainment, which is in turn
related with lower incomes. See Spence (1973) and Becker and Chiswick (1966).
11Arpaia, Dibzack and Pierini (2009) dene fundamental reforms as those which change the
rst pillar from a dened benet to a notional dened contribution scheme, transfer public
pension savings to privately funded schemes or change the eligibility conditions (increase in
statutory retirement age, etc.); non-fundamental reforms as those which change the tax regime
of contributions and pension benets, gradually introduce second and third pillar or change the
indexation rules; the last group comprises reforms that phase-out early retirement schemes.
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2).12 Albuquerque, Arcanjo and Escaria (2009) also investigate the relationship
between income and retirement choices. If personal income a¤ects negatively
the decision of early retirement, capital income does not seem to play any role
in labor supply choices. This is somewhat in contrast with what the life-cycle
theory predicts: as Diamond (2005) argues, the increase in real earnings should
have deterred older workers to continue to supply labor as the income e¤ect
could have ensured higher consumption and higher leisure. What seems to be
the case is that the opportunity cost of leaving the workforce is higher when
labor income is higher, thus making it more expensive for high-income workers
to retire earlier.
My analysis di¤ers from that of Albuquerque, Arcanjo and Escaria (2009) in
two important dimensions: rst, I use a di¤erent dataset, theQuadros de Pessoal
(QdP), a Portuguese dataset that includes information on workers and rms that
is collected every year from 1986 to 2009.13 Second, although I also estimate
hazard rates and investigate the characteristics of the early retirees, the nal aim
of my work is to understand if an early retirement reform has, ceteris paribus,
an impact on the overall process of job creation in Portugal. My analysis is
conducted at the rm level using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to evaluate
the impact of the early retirement reform approved by the Portuguese policy
maker in January 1999 on the worker ows. Specically, I am interested in
understanding whether rms e¤ectively replaced early retirees with prime-age
and young workers, thus supporting the policy from an across-cohorts labor
creation standpoint.
3 Institutional Framework
In this section I discuss the institutional framework in which the analysis is
conducted. I start with an overview of the social security system in Portugal to
then discuss the reforms implemented by the Portuguese legislator in the period
between 1993 and 2012.
3.1 Social security system in Portugal
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Portuguese public social security system was
composed by three pillars: the insurance-based subsystem, the non-contributory
subsystem and the social action subsystem. The most important of the three is
the insurance-based one, which is divided in a general scheme and a small volun-
tary insurance component and provides earnings-related benets. The system
12Sickles and Taubman (1986), for instance, nd that health and education, among other
factors, inuence the retirement decision. Their results are quite consistent as they are gen-
erated by structural estimation of a joint health-retirement model to account for error depen-
dencies and other factors. They also argue that health might be endogenous because it could
be a¤ected by the occupational choice of the individuals, typically in the unskilled professions.
13With the exception of 1990 and 2001.
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covers all the workers in the private sector (both employees and self-employed)
and o¤ers protection against a decrease in earnings due to unemployment, oc-
cupational disease, sickness, employment injury, disability, old-age and death.
The system is run on a PAYG basis and it is funded by contributions of workers
(11%), self-employed (until 1998 23%-28% of the reference income, after 25.4%-
32%) and employers (23.5%). Before 1993 the pension was calculated using as
reference earnings the average of the highest 5 annual labor earnings over the
last 10. Full pension was released with at least 36 years of contributions and
the formula used was P =W  2:2%N , where P is the pension, W reference
nominal earnings, N the number of contribution years and 2:2% the benet
accrual rate. The statutory retirement age was 65 for men and 62 for women.14
3.2 Towards the early retirement reform
Back in 1982, in the document EU 82/857/CEE, the European Council rec-
ommended a exible retirement policy, allowing workers to postpone or bring
forward their retirement age. In other words, retirement age was not seen as
mandatory. In addition, member States should not penalize excessively those
who decide to retire early, and the penalty on pension benets should not pre-
vent those who are entitled to exercise their early retirement rights.
The Portuguese policy maker was not the leader in introducing the aforemen-
tioned principles in the national legislation. The introduction of the rst proper
early retirement scheme dates back in 1993, with the approval of the Decree-
Law 329/1993. The entitled were the long-term unemployed with at least 55
years of age and 30 years of contributions to the social security scheme.15 The
legislator introduced a penalty for early retirement corresponding to 4.5% of the
value of the benets for each year the pension was received below the statutory
retirement age (65 years old). The penalty was reduced by one year for every
3 extra years of contributions above the minimum 30 years to be eligible. For
instance, a worker with 33 years of contributions in the situation of long-term
unemployed could have claimed retirement benets at the age of 64 without
incurring into a penalty for early retirement. In addition, the 1993 reform in-
creased gradually the statutory retirement age for women from 62 to 65, by 6
months every year in the 1994-1999 period, increased the window over which
reference earnings are calculated and changed the pension formation formula.16
The new pension was calculated using the formula P = WR  2%  N , where
P is the pension, WR the real reference earnings, calculated as the average of
the 10 highest annual labor earnings in the last 15, N the number of years of
14Given that until 2009 the system did not apply to workers employed in the nancial sector,
I exclude them from the sample. The Decree Law 54/2009 determined the unication of the
two systems. Today, workers employed in the nancial sector are covered by the insurance-
based subsystem.
15According to the Portuguese legislation,long-term unemployed are those who have been
actively searching for a job for more than 12 months.
16For an extensive analysis on the e¤ect of the increase in the legal retirement age for women
on the labor market ows and rmsperformance see Martins, Novo and Portugal (2009).
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contributions and 2% the accrual rate. Substantially, the 1993 reform aimed at
strengthening the tax-benet link of the social security system.
With the approval of the Decree-Law 9/99 in January 1999 the Portuguese
legislator, inspired by the aforementioned EU principles on exible retirement,
extended the early retirement scheme to all workers with at least 55 years of age
and 30 years of contributions to the system, with the same penalty structure as
in the 1993 reform. The reform was aimed at improving labor market conditions
(possibly to free-up jobs for younger workers) and at allowing workers with
complete working lives to retire earlier.
The latter reform represents a policy experiment through which analyze
the retirement decisions of the workers and assess the overall e¤ect of such a
reform on the worker ows in Portugal. More concretely, I am interested in
understanding whether elderly workers e¤ectively take on the early retirement
opportunity and which are the characteristics of the early retirees. As I showed
in Tables 1 and 2, Portugal is one of the few countries in which participation
rates for elderly workers dropped in the 2000sdecade. In addition, participation
rates are much lower for elderly uneducated workers. Thus, one must shed some
light on who nds more convenient to retire early. The issue is puzzling: on
the one hand, one might think that if income is high, the income e¤ect prevails
on the substitution e¤ect and higher consumption is possible even with fewer
working hours. Thus, high-income individuals retire earlier. On the other, high
labor income might retain workers from retiring earlier as the opportunity cost
would be too high. Finally, the implicit tax on continued work plays a great
role in the retirement decision.
We can also analyze the e¤ect of the 1999 reform from the labor demand
perspective. Older workers are typically less productive, and might be costlier
for rms than young individuals. Firms could take advantage of the early re-
tirement scheme to dismiss older workers and replace them with younger and
more productive ones. If this is the case, then the 1999 reform can be deemed
as a success, in the sense that stimulated young employment while exibilizing
the retirement decision of workers with a complete working path. If the reform
instead reduced the participation of older workers without stimulating young
employment, then it is more of a failure in the sense that it created a burden
on the social security system by posing risks to its long term sustainability.
The time horizon of my analysis goes from 1993, when the early retirement
scheme was rstly introduced, to 2005, when the scheme was suspended until
December 31, 2006.17 By 2005 it was clear to the Portuguese legislator that
the penalty for early retirement was insu¢ cient to maintain the nancial sus-
tainability of the social security system in the long run. In addition, the demo-
graphic evolution of the population added to the accumulation of decits in the
insurance-based subsystem. A system that incentivized early retirement with
the levy of an implicit tax on continued work was not consistent with the need
of promoting longer working careers, and thus reformed. Using the Quadros de
Pessoal dataset, which I describe in the next section, I can show that for those
17Decree-Law 125/2005, August 3, 2005.
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individuals in the 55-65-age range the average retirement age decreased after
1999, to only increase again after 2005, when the early retirement scheme was
suspended (Chart 1). In 2007 the legislator, after conducting a study on the sus-
tainability of the pension system, reintroduced the early retirement scheme with
an increase in the penalty for early retirement (6% of the value of the benets
for every year the pension is received in advance of the 65 years old statutory
retirement age). Lately this year, the Government temporarily suspended the
scheme again under recommendation of the o¢ cial sector (European Central
Bank, European Commission and the International Monetary Fund, so-called
Troika) in the mark of the Economic Adjustment Program.
Chart 1. Average retirement age, male workers 55-65, 1993-200518
Source: Quadros de Pessoal (QdP) and authors calculations
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Data
To conduct my analysis I use Quadros de Pessoal (QdP), a longitudinal dataset
matching employers and employees in Portugal. The dataset is collected every
year from 1986 to 2009 in the reference month (March up to 1993, October
since 1994) by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security based on a
census of rms employing at least one worker.19 Civil servant, self-employed
and domestic workers are excluded from the sample. Coverage of agriculture is
not extensive given the low share of wage earners in the sector. Personnel on
18Workers with a working life below 30 years were excluded from the sample. Data were
not collected in 2001.
19Data was not collected in 1990 and 2001.
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short-term leave, such as sickness or maternity, are included, while those in long-
term leave, such as military service, are not. Workers and rms entering the
database are assigned a unique identication number (social security number in
the case of the workers), which ensures they can be followed over time.
The dataset is very rich in details: rms reported data include location,
industry, legal setting, the share of public/private and domestic/foreign owner-
ship and employment, while for workers it reports characteristics such as gender,
age, skill and education level, hiring date, occupation, tenure, earnings, hours
worked and so on.
There are multiple advantages when using such a dataset. First of all, the
survey is mandatory and thus has a very high response rate. Secondly, employer-
reported data are know to be less subject to measurement error than worker-
reported data, such as those coming from the unemployment survey. Last and
most important, given the mandatory nature of the survey, well-know problems
of panel data such as panel attrition are considerably attenuated.
The main disadvantage of using the QdP is that one cannot tell whether
a worker is unemployed, left the labor force or has opted for retirement when
he/she leaves the dataset. In the next subsection I discuss in detail the denition
of retirement used and comment on the modications to the dataset prior to
the empirical estimation.
4.2 Methodology
I overcome the aforementioned problem related to the QdP by dening as re-
tirement year the maximum year in which a worker is present in the sample.
Retirement age is dened as the age in the retirement year. Given that some
individuals may drop from the sample at very early stages, I restrict the obser-
vations to those individuals aged 45-75, i.e., 10 years before legal retirement is
possible and 10 years after the statutory retirement age. The choice related to
the rst possible retirement age is based on previous literature. For instance,
Latulippe (1996) estimates the average retirement age for OECD countries in
the period 1950-1990 and denes 45 years old as the minimum retirement age.
Given that the 1993 and 1999 reforms only allow for early retirement if a worker
has contributed for at least 30 years to the system, I include in the sample only
workers with at least 30 years work experience.
In my analysis I only cover workers in the secondary and tertiary sectors,
while I drop primary sectors workers. I also exclude nancial sectors workers
as until 2009 they were not covered by the public social security system.
The labor market e¤ects of the 1993 reform, which gradually increased the
legal retirement age for women from 62 to 65 in the 1994-1999 period, are likely
to interfere with the impact of the 1999 reform and for this reason I remove
female workers from the sample.
The time span of my analysis goes from 1993, when the rst early retirement
reform was approved, to 2005, when early retirement was suspended.
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In the next two subsections I present, respectively, the methodology used for
the survival analysis and for the di¤erence in di¤erence estimates implemented
to analyze the process of job creation in Portugal after the 1999 reform.
4.2.1 Survival analysis
The rst step I take in the estimation of the hazard and survival function is
the non-parametric approach, widely used for descriptive purposes. From the
QdP we have t1 < ::: < tj < ::: < t30 observed discrete failure times of the
spells, from 45 to 75 years old. These correspond to the di¤erent possible ages
of exit from the labor market (retirement). At the end of period j we have dj
individuals who dropped from the sample. To account for right censoring, we
dene cj as the censored spell in the time interval [tj ; tj+1). Given the way I
dened retirement, right censoring only occurs for those individuals who are still
in the sample at the end of 2005. For these spells, we only know that the failure
time is greater than tj . The number of spells at risk just before tj , denoted rj ,
is then composed by those who have no yet failed and those who are censored,
that is, rj = (dj + cj) + (dj+1 + cj+1) + :::+ (d30 + c30). In the rst period the
number of individual at risk is the entire sample.
The hazard rate is the probability of exiting from the labor market at the
end of period j conditional on being active until tj . In other words, hj =
Pr[T = tj jT  tj ], where hj is the hazard rate. An easy way to estimate the
non-parametric hazard rate is then:
bhj = dj
rj
(1)
which is the number of spells ending at time j divided by the number of spells
at risk at time j.
The product limit estimator of the survivor function, also know as the
Kaplan-Meier estimator, is given by:
bS(t) = Y
jjtjt
rj   dj
rj
=
Y
jjtjt
(1  bhj) (2)
which is the multiplication over the j time intervals of the proportion of indi-
viduals surviving over the spells at risk.
To estimate consistently fully parametric model for single-spell duration data
I use a proportional hazard model, in which the conditional hazard rate of the
form h(tjX) = h0(t; )(X;) is factored into separate functions, one of time
and a time parameter alone, h0(t; ), and the other of the x covariates. The typ-
ical form chosen for the latter is the exponential one, (X;) = exp(0X). This
form makes the interpretation of coe¢ cient easier, as a unitary change in the zth
explanatory variable increases the hazard rate by exp(z). Given the discrete
nature of the dataset, in which failure times are essentially discrete, it might
not be accurate to use continuous-time models such as the Cox PH specication
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to estimate the e¤ect of the reform on the hazard rate of exiting the labor mar-
ket. Discrete-time hazard models can be estimated using the complementary
log-log specication (cloglog), but this method requires the specication of a
functional form for the baseline hazard. I use a piecewise constant specication
for the baseline hazard, which consists of six intervals, one for every group of
ve years from 45 to 75 years old.
The discrete-time interval hazard function hj(X;) is:
hj(X;) =
S(aj 1; X)  S(aj ; X)
S(aj 1; X)
= 1  exp[exp(0X)  (Hj 1  Hj)] (3)
The log-log denomination comes from the fact that taking the log of (3)
twice we get:
log(  log[1  hj(X)]) = 0X + log(Hj 1  Hj) (4)
The baseline hazard for interval j is dened as log(  log[1   h0(X)]) =
log(Hj 1   Hj) = j , and its functional form needs to be specied (piecewise
constant in my case).
In the discrete-time duration model the interpretation of the coe¢ cients of
the covariates is the same as in the Cox PH model. After dening the reform
variable as a dummy that takes value 1 in 1999 and after and 0 before the reform
was implemented, the cloglog model tells us that in the post-reform period the
hazard rate increased by exp(post).
Another important issue that has to be taken into account is the unobserved
heterogeneity (frailty). When analyzing retirement choices of individuals some
factors might be omitted either because i) data is not available or ii) character-
istics are intrinsically unobservable. In addition, there might be some measure-
ment errors in the observed characteristics of the covariates, although I have
already discussed in subsection 4.1 that using the QdP considerably reduces the
chances of such errors. If unobserved heterogeneity is ignored in the model, one
can get underestimation of the positive duration dependence in the hazard rate.
Another issue when ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity is that one gets an
underestimation of the true change in the hazard rate from a unitary change in
the zth regressor (z). Thus, controlling for the frailty is also important for the
correct interpretation of the parameters of the covariates.
In my analysis, instead of assuming a continuous distribution for the frailty
component, I follow a non-parametric approach proposed by Heckman and
Singer (1984). The idea is to use a discrete mixing distribution instead of a
continuous one, and to t the discrete distribution through a series of parame-
ters. These parameters are a number of mass points and the probabilities of
a worker being located at each mass point. The duration dependence is now
di¤erent for individuals pertaining to di¤erent groups (mass points). Of course
the choice of the number of mass points in not obvious, but in my analysis I
will assume there are two types of individuals, the early and late exiters. The
hazard rate will be of the form:
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hj(jjX) = 1  exp[  exp(m + 0X + j)]; for m = 1; 2 (5)
Using this approach we have two hazard functions, one for each group of in-
dividuals. In my case, 1 > 2, where 1 is the intercept for the early exiters, for
whom the hazard rate is higher. The contribution to the sample log-likelihood
for each individual with spell length j is the probability-weighted sum of the
contributions for both groups.
4.2.2 Di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach and worker ows at the rm
level
In this subsection I discuss the methodology used to estimate the impact of
the 1999 reform on the worker ows at the rm level in Portugal. The follow-
ing discussion is based on a review of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences methodology
o¤ered by Blundell and Costa-Dias (2008). For illustration purposes, I apply
the discussion of the methodology to the net job creation of rms, which is the
di¤erence in the number of workers in the pre- and post-reform periods.20
Dening the treatment and control groups is a key step in any valid policy
evaluation method, especially when dealing with a natural experiment. In fact,
in a non-experimental setting assignment to the treatment group is almost al-
ways not random. Consider the following specication for the employment of
rm i in year t (Lit):
Lit = c+ idi + 
0Xit + uit (6)
where c is the intercept, d the treatment dummy variable, X a vector of covari-
ates with their respective coe¢ cients and u a variable that collects unobservable
characteristics of the rm. The parameter i is the e¤ect of the reform on the
employment of treated rm i. Randomization essentially corresponds to two
assumptions:
A1 : E[uijdi = 1] = E[uijdi = 0] = [ui] (7)
A2 : E[ijdi = 1] = E[ijdi = 0] = [i] (8)
These assumptions state that there is no selection bias on the untreated
outcome, i.e., there is no selection in the treatment group (A1), and that there
is no selection bias on the expected outcome of the reform (A2). In my case, a
rm is selected in the treated group if it hires at least one worker aged 55-65
with a minimum of 30 years work experience, thus the assumptions A1 and A2
do not hold, the latter because some rm may decide to be in the treatment
group as it can be inuenced to a greater extent by the reform.
20The same methodology applies to the analysis of hirings, separations and hirings of young
workers (aged 15-24).
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If in principle one should be interested in the average treatment e¤ect, in
practice when leaving the aforementioned assumptions one can only identify
the average treatment on the treated (ATT ), which will be the parameter of
interest in my analysis. The idea behind the ATT is that each rm experiences
a di¤erent e¤ect due to the treatment, and therefore each parameter associated
to the treatment variable is di¤erent: the estimate of this parameter will be the
average of all the di¤erent parameters across the treated units. The ATT tells
us what is the average e¤ect of the early retirement reform in 1999 on the net
job creation process in treated rms.
Given that the framework of the analysis is a quasi-natural experiment, I can
recreate partial randomization by using the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation
strategy (DID), which consists in di¤erencing the outcomes for the treated
and non-treated before and after the change in policy takes place, assuming
that there are rm-specic xed e¤ects included in the error term of (7). The
treatment group is composed by rms that employ at least one worker aged
55-65 with a minimum of 30 years work experience.
A common problem of these non-experimental settings is that the control
group may di¤er from the treated group up to some observable characteristics.
To make the estimate of the ATT more precise, we then need to choose appro-
priately the units to include in the control group. This analysis is known as
matching. The basic idea behind matching is that it recreates the treatment
characteristics among the non-treated units, thus recreating the experimental
setting that is missing in non-experimental settings. Correctly choosing the
control group assures that the only di¤erence between this and the treatment
group is due to program participation.
The key assumption of the matching procedure is the conditional indepen-
dence assumption (CIA):
L0i ; L
1
i ? dijXi (9)
E[uijdi; Xi] = E[uijXi] (10)
The assumption at (10) states that after controlling for a su¢ cient number
of covariates the participation is independent on the treated and non-treated
outcomes. The assumption at (11) is a direct consequence of (10), and states
that the conditional mean of the error term is independent from the decision of
participation. If CIA holds, then we can say that there is no selection bias on
the unobservables.
The implication of the CIA is that treated and non-treated units are compa-
rable with respect to the untreated outcome after controlling for characteristics
included in the vector X. For each L1 we have to nd some L0 with the same X
(in term of rms characteristics) and use L0 as the counterfactual for L1. This,
of course, implies that the variables contained in X do not determine exactly
participation, otherwise we will not be able to nd any counterfactual with the
same X. This is the second important assumption of matching, the support
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condition, which basically says that the probability of participating given X is
not trivial. More formally:
Pr[di = 1jXi] < 1 (11)
Another delicate issue when applying matching estimator is that we have to
choose which variables to include in the X vector: too many variables would
imply the failure of the common support condition, while too little set of vari-
ables would imply the failure of CIA. So in applying matching one should be
careful at the moment of selecting variables. The problems that arise here can
be addressed using matching on a function of X: this is usually modeled as the
probability of being treated and it is called propensity score. More formally, it
is dened as follows:
P (X) = Pr(d = 1jX) (12)
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrated that if the CIA is valid for X
then it is also valid for the propensity score P (X). There is an important
advantage in using P (X) instead of X, and is that we reduce the matching
problem to a single dimension (the probability of being treated). Given that
the nature of the treatment is not binary but discrete, I choose a slightly di¤erent
approach. To estimate the propensity score I choose a Poisson model and use as
dependent variable the number of workers aged 55-65 with at least 30 years work
experience. The resulting propensity score is the expected number of workers
with the aforementioned characteristics that a rm is likely to employ, given a
set of covariates (X). The control group is chosen according to some pre-dened
criteria, such as the proximity between the propensity score of the treatment
and control group. In other words, rms are matched based on the expected
number of 55-65 workers with at least 30 years work experience they are likely
to hire given their characteristics.
Once we have a set of comparisons for the treated units we have to choose the
weights to associate the selected set of non-treated observations to each treated
observation. There are several methods to do that: I opt for kernel matching,
which assigns a greater weight to the untreated units whose propensity score is
closer to the propensity score of the treated units. The kernel matching uses
a weighting function, which is decreasing in the distance from the propensity
score of the treated (more distant is the untreated propensity to the treated
propensity score, less weight it receives in the matching procedure). In any
case, the types of weights one decides to use do not a¤ect how the matching
estimator is obtained.
When facing a quasi-natural experiment can be very suitable to combine
DID and the matching estimator to obtain the so-called MDID estimator.
Using this estimator we can relax the assumptions posed by the matching esti-
mator. The basic problem surges with the CIA: usually the information included
in X is not enough to guarantee that the decision whether to participate or not
is independent on the untreated outcome up to a vector X. So using DID
we can eliminate the e¤ect on the decision of the unobserved variables as long
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as they are constant over time (rm-specic xed e¤ects). In other words, we
can adapt the CIA in (10) using the A1 randomization assumption for the DID
estimator:
A1 DID : E[uit1   uit0 jdi = 1] = [uit1   uit0 jdi = 0] = [uit1   uit0 ] (13)
The revised CIA is:
(uit1   uit0) ? dit1 jXi (14)
The matching hypotheses discussed above hold but now in term of the di¤er-
ence between before and after the treatment instead of levels: this means that
the suitable units to be used as control groups are those who have evolved in
the same way as the treated units if the latter had not received the treatment.
Given that we are working with a longitudinal dataset, the resulting match-
ing estimator is:
bATT = P
i2T
(
[Lit1   Lit0 ] 
P
j2C
ewij [Ljt1   Ljt0
)
wi (15)
where T and C refer to the treatment and control group and ewij to the weights
assigned by kernel matching when comparing the untreated rm j with the
correspondent treated rm.
5 Results
5.1 Worker level analysis
The 1999 reform introduced early retirement to workers with 30 years of con-
tributions to the social security system and a 55-65-age range, and had a non-
negligible impact on the retirement decision of Portuguese workers. As showed
in Chart 1, the average retirement age for individuals aged 55-65 decreased from
59.47 in 1999 to 58.99 in 2005, to then increase back to 59.45 after the early
retirement scheme was suspended in 2005. In what follows, I include in the
dataset workers in the 45-75-age range with at least 30 years work experience.
As discussed before, I exclude women and workers in the nancial sector from
the sample.
Chart 2 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function for the pre- and post-
reform period. The survivor function is decreasing with time more rapidly in
the post-reform period, with the di¤erence being statistically signicant at the
1% level. Chart 3 shows the smoothed hazard rates for the pre- and post-reform
period. Given that the construction is speculative to the survivor function, the
hazard rate of leaving the labor market is higher in the post-reform period.
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Given the discrete nature of the dataset, I use a complementary log-log model
(clog-log) with piecewise constant baseline hazard to estimate the hazard rate.
Given that only workers aged 55-65 are a¤ected by the reform, I am interested in
the interaction between the reform dummy and a treatment dummy that takes
value one if the individual is in the 55-65-age range, and zero otherwise. As
discussed in the previous section, the estimates of the model might be a¤ected
by unobserved factors. After accounting for unobserved heterogeneity using the
mass-point distribution approach proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984), I
obtain that in the post-reform period the hazard rate increases by 18.7% (see
Table 3).21
Chart 2. Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function (pre- and post-reform)
The heterogeneity follows a discrete distribution across two groups of indi-
viduals, the early and late exiters. Only 12.7% of the workers are of the former
type, and for this group the baseline hazard rate is considerably higher. The
results are as expected: the baseline hazard is increasing with age (positive
duration dependence in the hazard rate) and the education level has a great
impact on the hazard of leaving the labor market. For instance, holding an
undergraduate degree decreases the hazard rate by 40,96%.
21Non-reported controls include the log of the size and the education level of the workers
(from below primary to undergraduate degree).
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Chart 3: Smoothed hazard estimates (pre- and post-reform)
The analysis supports the hypothesis that the 1999 reform caused a reduc-
tion in the working lives of Portuguese workers, as it did not set the adequate
penalties for early retirement. If the education level determines at least in part
income, results also indicate that the opportunity cost of leaving the labor mar-
ket might be higher for high-income individuals.
Given the issues discussed above, exible retirement age uncoupled with the
nancial incentives to work longer could represent a weight on the working class
and nally on the sustainability of the social security system itself. The latter
essentially depends on the ability of the economy to generate enough jobs to
replace the early retirees and to keep the shape of the population pyramid.
If the demographic trend does not support the latter hypothesis, I can test
whether Portuguese rms have indeed replaced older workers who chose early
retirement with young and prime-age ones. Particularly, if the reform was aimed
at generating vacancies for younger workers, did it have the desired e¤ect? In the
next subsection I answer this question using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis
applied to Portuguese rms.
5.2 Firm level analysis
After organizing the dataset by rm and removing the units with more than 100
workers, I dene net job creation in year t as the di¤erence in the employment
of rm i in year t and year t   j, where j is the base year. Given that I am
interested in the cumulative e¤ect of the reform on the net job creation in year
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t, I use as the base year 1998, which is the last year before the approval of the
early retirement reform. For instance, net job creation in 1999 is the di¤erence
in the number of employees in 1999 compared with 1998. Net job creation is
computed for 1999, 2000 and 2002. Secondly, I dene the treatment variable as
one if a rm employs at least one worker in the 55-65-age range and a minimum
of 30 years work experience, and zero otherwise. Given the discrete nature of
the treatment, to estimate the propensity score assigned to each treated and
untreated unit I use a Poisson specication with the number of workers in the
55-65-age range as the dependent variable, and the log of the sales, the share of
public and foreign capital, the sector where the rm operates, dummies for rm
size, the square and cubic of the number of workers employed, the log of the total
remuneration (dened as the average remuneration times the number of workers
in each rm) and the square and cubic of the log of the total remuneration as
covariates.
Table 3. clog-log model with unobserved heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Exit = {0,1}
Variables Coe¢ cient Standard error
[45, 50) 0:701 0:085
[50, 55) 1:772 0:082
[55, 60) 2:305 0:082
[60, 65) 2:857 0:082
[65, 70) 3:080 0:083
[70, 75] 3:365 0:087
post-reform 0:119 0:014
post-reform  treatment 0:171 0:016
log(size) 0:074 0:002
primary education  0:085 0:016
secondary education  0:221 0:025
vocational education  0:404 0:152
college  0:527 0:033
constant  4:06 0:080
constantType E 3:404 0:040
Prob. Type E 12:7% 0:002
Prob. Type L 87:3% 0:002
Observations 377,854
E = early exiter; L = late exiter
p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1
After obtaining the propensity score, I match rms using the propensity
score matching technique described in section 4.2.2, using the Poisson propensity
scores and the Epachenikov kernel function (with bandwidth parameter h = 0:2)
to choose the appropriate controls for the treated units. Results are shown in
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table 4. Using the Poisson model to calculate the propensity scores, I nd that
the treated rms have created, on average, 1.16, 2.22 and 3.84 less jobs than
their untreated counterparts in the period from 1998 to 1999, 2000 and 2002,
respectively, with the results being statistically signicant at the 1% level.
To better understand to what extent the net job creation process comes from
less hirings, more separations or a combination of both, I calculate, using the
same methodology, the e¤ect of the 1999 early retirement reform on hirings and
separations of Portuguese rms in the selected cumulated periods. Hirings are
calculated as the number of workers hired in year t from year t   j, where j
is the base year (1998), while separations as the di¤erence between hirings and
net job creation. Using the Poisson specication I nd that treated rms hired,
on average, 1.02, 1.49 and 1.43 workers less than their untreated counterparts
from 1998 to 1999, 2000 and 2002, respectively. Regarding separations, treated
rms lost, on average, 0.52, 1.10 and 2.23 workers more than their untreated
counterparts from 1998 to 1999, 2000 and 2002, respectively. Results on hirings
and separations are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Table 4. ATT: Kernel Matching - Poisson Propensity Score
Cumulative until
Base Year = 1998 1999 2000 2002
Net job creation  1:156  2:219  3:845
(0:119) (0:148) (0:209)
Hirings (Total)  1:027  1:492  1:433
(0:066) (0:134) (0:193)
Separations 0:525 1:102 2:226
(0:102) (0:158) (0:255)
Hirings (aged 15-24)  0:522  0:861  0:890
(0:029) (0:051) (0:074)
Treated (%) 2:587% 2:967% 3:429%
Untreated (%) 97:413% 97:033% 96:571%
Total 138; 797 117; 243 89; 275
Standard errors in parenthesis
p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1
Analyzing the labor demand of rms by cohort is helpful in understanding
whether exible retirement schemes have, on the one hand, facilitated the early
exit from the labor market, and on the other created opportunities for younger
workers. After dividing workers by cohort, I calculate the hirings of workers
aged 15-24 for rm i. Treated units have, on average, hired 0.52, 0.86 and 0.89
less young workers than the untreated units in the 1998-1999, 2000 and 2002
periods, respectively, with the results being statistically signicant at the 1%
level.
Given the nature of the reform, one would expect that the net job creation
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process should be largely driven by separations. Although in the rst two years
the e¤ect of the reform on hirings is higher than its e¤ect on separations (in
absolute value), in the 1998-2002 period treated rms have, on average, dis-
missed around two more workers than their untreated counterparts, while they
have hired only around one worker less than the untreated rms. As expected,
separations became the main determinant of net job creation from a cumulative
standpoint. The reasons why rms should dismiss older workers with complete
working paths could be various: rst of all, workersproductivity. Lazear (1979)
argues that retirement is mandatory because at an old age the wage level of the
workers tends to exceed their productivity level. Thus, rms might nd costlier
to retain old workers.
Another reason could be the age structure of the rm. A rm with an old age
structure is largely composed of workers whose skills are obsolete, especially dur-
ing a period of skilled-biased technological change. Such a rm might facilitate
early retirement. On the other hand, it is not clear why rms do not substitute
old with prime-age and younger workers. Older workers may be less productive
than younger ones, and a rm might be willing to renew its personnel structure
by dismissing obsolete workers. This does not seem to be the case of Portugal,
as treated units have, on average, hired around one less young worker than their
untreated counterparts in the 1998-2002 period, thus not supporting the afore-
mentioned hypothesis. The production structure could play an important role:
a rm with an obsolete production structure might nd it di¢ cult to attract
young individuals with an up-to-date formation. What seems to be the case
for Portugal is that young workers are not suitable substitutes of older workers,
and, perhaps, the physical capital structure of rms is not complementary with
the skills of the emerging labor force.
The issue remains puzzling. What seems clear is that the reform failed to
achieve its objective: if, on the one hand, it exibilized the retirement decision
of older workers, on the other it failed to stimulate employment of younger
workers, posing risks to the sustainability of the rst pillar of the social security
system.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the e¤ects of the reform approved by the Portuguese
legislator in 1999 on the worker ows. The reform extended early retirement
to every worker aged 55-65 with at least 30 years work experience. Following
the EU Council Directive of 1982, the Portuguese policy maker reformed the
social security system by rendering exible the retirement decision of workers
with a complete working path. Amongst the motivations of the early retirement
reform, the policy maker was moved by the possibility of improving labor market
conditions for the youngest cohorts. In other words, by allowing older workers
to retire earlier, the legislator hoped for the possibility of freeing up jobs for
young workers.
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I analyze the e¤ect of the reform from two perspectives: labor supply (worker
level analysis) and labor demand (rm level analysis). Using discrete-time mod-
els for survival analysis, I nd that the reform had a strong impact on the re-
tirement decisions of older workers: the hazard rate of leaving the labor market
increased by around 19% in the post-reform period. Thus, even though early
retirement implies the payment of a penalty on pension benets, workers an-
ticipate their retirement decision. Previous literature investigates the reasons
why workers should retire before the statutory retirement age. Diamond (2005)
argues that the increase in real incomes allows for higher consumption even with
fewer working hours. Thus, high-income individuals should nd convenient to
retire earlier. However, investigating the characteristics of early retirees, I nd
that the individuals who opt for early retirement are the less educated ones. If
education determines, at least in part, the income level, it might be the case that
for high-income individuals the opportunity cost of leaving the labor market is
high, thus making it less attractive to retire earlier. Also Blöndal and Scarpetta
(1998) nd that in the EU early retirees are, on average, the less educated ones.
I also analyze the e¤ect of the 1999 reform on rmsemployment adjustment.
Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences matching estimator, I nd that rms that em-
ploy at least one worker aged 55-65 with a minimum of 30 years work experience
(treated units) create, on average, 2 less jobs in the 1998-2002 period than rms
that do not employ such workers. Instead of stimulating job creation, the reform
has resulted in a job destruction process. Investigating the dynamics of the job
creation process, I nd that it is largely driven by separations. In other words,
treated units have dismissed more workers than their untreated counterparts
in the 1998-2002 period. Firms could dismiss older workers because they are
less productive, and they might replace them with younger ones. This does
not seem to be case for Portugal, according to the ndings discussed above. In
fact, investigating the hirings of young workers I nd that treated rms employ
around one less worker aged 15-24 than the untreated units in the 1998-2002
period. Thus, the reform failed to stimulate young employment. Also the age
and production structure could play a role: a rm with an old age structure
is usually composed of older and obsolete workers, and might facilitate early
retirement. At the same time, if the rm has an obsolete production structure,
it might fail to attract young workers with an up-to-date formation. Such rms
destroy employment as a consequence of the reform.
As in many other European countries, the Portuguese social security sys-
tem is su¤ering from a low participation rate of older and young workers. By
allowing workers to retire earlier and failing to stimulate young employment,
the 1999 reform deteriorated the nancial sustainability of the insurance-based
subsystem, given the increase in life expectancy and the resulting higher old-age
dependency ratio.
The policy implications of my analysis are various. First of all, policy makers
should take into account that education is an important determinant of early
retirement when reforming the social security system. They should design pro-
grams aimed at encouraging less educated workers to remain on the workplace
and increase penalties for early retirement. In addition, they should improve the
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information channel on the consequences of early retirement, especially for less
educated workers who might nd di¢ cult to fully understand the decrease in
their pension wealth. Another important fact policy makers should not overlook
is that younger workers are not perfect substitutes for older ones, as they might
di¤er in terms of experience and position held within a rm. As I showed,
young employment did not o¤set the increase in separations of workers aged
55-65, posing risks to the sustainability of the social security system.
Further research is needed to investigate the reasons why rms dismiss old
workers without replacing them with younger ones. More concretely, looking at
the breakdown of hirings and separations by education or qualication of older
workers might provide some insights on the dynamics underlying the net job
creation process. Firms might be willing to dismiss old and low-educated work-
ers and retain the more productive and educated ones. If this is the case, early
retirement reforms should be complemented by job training programs addressed
at improving the qualication and the education level of workers that are more
likely to retire earlier.
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